The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

August 2015

A Response to Lee Kreindler
Robert P. Boyle

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Air and Space Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Boyle, Robert P. (1973) "A Response to Lee Kreindler," Akron Law Review: Vol. 6 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol6/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Boyle: Symposium: The Guatemala Protocol

A RESPONSE TO LEE KREINDLER
ROBERT P. BOYLE

EE KRENDLER is certainly right; if you are injured by a car, a train, a

bus or a brick you suffer a measurable loss for which you want to
recover. He is also right that the Warsaw Convention limitation of liability
cuts off some portion of that recovery for some people. Probably in the
cases he mentioned that would happen. He concludes that to the extent
that such loss is not fully compensated the airlines, manufacturers, government and others have been subsidized by the international passengers and
that none of these need subsidy at the expense of the needy claimants.
However, before accepting this as an inescapable conclusion, possibly
a look at some other facets of the problem might be desirable. First, under
the Guatemala Protocol, the carrier is made absolutely liable to the
passenger for death or injury and has given up all defenses except that of
contributory negligence.' In other words, the carrier cannot escape liability
because the accident was caused -by an act of God, war, hijacking, riot,
insurrection, sabotage or any one of a number of other circumstances over
which the carrier has no control and which, under normal conditions, the
carrier would be able to plead in defense of his liability. The only defense
the carrier has left is that of contributory negligence which, in most
cases, is of limited value.
Now, this means to the international passenger that he doesn't have
to prove any fault by the carrier, and, except in rare cases, the carrier has
no way to avoid liability, even if it could prove in a given case that it was
not at fault. The net result is that the process of obtaining compensation
for the claimant is made substantially easier because the issues of fault
and the possible availability of defenses are removed. Lee Kreindler may
well respond to this that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, almost
universally applied by United States courts in aviation accident cases,
really accomplishes this result anyway. 2 I happen not to agree. For
instance, under the Guatemala Protocol, the carrier with one exception

I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-

tation

by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.

876 (1934) as amended at the Hague, 1955, and at Guatemala City, 1971, Art. IV.
2 Hildred, Air Carriers'Liability: Significance of The Warsaw Convention and Events
Leading Up To The Montreal Agreement, 33 J. AMi L. & CoM. 545 (1967); see also
Id. at 711-714.
[1411
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will have no defenses left at all which, in today's aviation environment
where the hijacker, the saboteur, and even armed attack are lamentably
frequent, is probably as important to the air carrier as the opportunity
to prove freedom from fault. In any event, even to get to the point
where the res ipsa loquitur applies, you are inevitably involved in
litigation and its expense which is one of the things the Guatemala
Protocol tries to minimize.
Thus, I believe that major sources of controversy in aviation accident
cases have been removed from the process of compensation by the
Guatemala Protocol and that this will speed recovery by the claimant and
reduce the cost to the claimant of that recovery. The result of this is that
the claimant will get his money quicker, and that more of it will stay in
his pocket instead of going for costs of litigation, including attorney's
fees. In fact, the only issue left in the compensation process should be
the argument over the amount of the damage. Admittedly, this can
be controversial, but, with pressure on the carrier to make an adequate
and timely offer of settlement, it should not be difficult or protracted.
Consequently, I believe that under the Guatemala Protocol the claimant
will get his money quicker and with a lot less expense than in the
domestic accident where no treaty applies.
Lee Kreindler, I am sure, will respond to what I have just said by
saying that the money received by the claimant under Guatemala is not
enough and he has cited cases where the $100,000 limit in the Guatemala
Protocol appears ridiculously low, but are these typical? The CAB figures
showed in 1970 that about one-half of all recoveries were $100,000 or
less, and if you went up to $300,000 over 80% of all cases had full
recovery. Thus, $100,000 is adequate in half the cases and $300,000
would take care of the great majority, although admittedly leaving some
few with uncompensated losses. Further, if you take into account the
value of the money to the claimant in six months to a year from
the date of the loss versus a larger sum received five to seven years
later, and after expensive litigation, it may be that even these few not
fully compensated cases become even fewer.
Now, as Mr. McPherson has pointed out there are, of course, other
reasons why the Guatemala Protocol is of value to the international
passenger. U.S. citizens whether we like it or not love to travel; they
travel all over the world and on almost anybody's airline. The Guatemala
Protocol assures them that if anything happens to them their legal rights
will be the same no matter whose airline they are on or where their injury
occurs. These rights include absolute liability with virtually no defenses by
the air carrier and a number of other benefits, including the opportunity
to bring suit in a court of the claimant's domicile if the carrier is otherwise
amenable to suit there. Lee Kreindler in his discussion of the cases his
firm is handling arising out of the hijacking and sabotage incidents in
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol6/iss2/5
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the Middle East in 1970 illustrates the value of these rights to claimants.
The absolute liability of the airlines makes these actions possible and
without it there is no cause of action against the carriers. In other
words, the international passenger has the benefit of an internationally
agreed upon uniform system that is stacked in his favor.

Such a system was not easy to achieve. Many countries were
unwilling to agree to a limit of $100,000 because recoveries in these
amounts in their courts are for their nationals unthinkable. However, in
the end, they agreed to $100,000 but would not go higher, so we accepted
that admittedly low limit on the condition that the other countries would
permit us to make separate provision for our citizens. Thus, we could
remain a party to a uniform international system, and provide its benefits
to United States citizens who use it more than the citizens of any other
country. The price for this uniform system is a limitation of liability
which may, in some cases, reduce potential recovery. It should be
noted, this will happen in only a very few cases and even in those cases
a very substantial recovery will be quickly and inexpensively available.
Just to show what speedy and inexpensive recovery can mean let us
consider a possible case. A claimant under a system with no limit and no
convention recovers ultimately $500,000. Without any convention in
existence, this normally will be after expensive litigation and ensuing
delays--on the average about six years. 4 Out of the $500,000 will come
all court costs, attorney's fees, expenses of investigation, expert witness
fees, etcetera. Assuming the usual one-third contigent fee and substantial,
but not unreasonable, investigative and other expenses, this means recovery
by the claimant after six years will probably be on the order of $300,000,
since $200,000 will go for attorney's fees and other litigation costs.
Under the Guatemala Protocol with a Supplemental System providing a
minimum of an additional $100,000 of recovery the same claimant would
get $200,000 ($100,000 from the airline and $100,000 from the
Supplemental System). However, his litigation expense and attorney's
fees, if any, should not exceed 10% of the $200,000 so that one year
from the date of accident he gets in his pocket $180,000. If this is
invested for the next five years (the equivalent date of recovery under an
unlimited system) it becomes about $240,000 assuming accumulation
of interest at the fairly conservative rate of 6%. Thus, the real difference

3 The cases referred to appear in Mr. Kreindler's article concerning Aerial Hijacking,
infra. (Ed.)
4See generally recovery tables published in 33 J. Am L. & CoM. 591-93 (1967).
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to the claimant is not the difference between $200,000 and $500,000
which seems to be the effect of a limitation system; the real difference is
about $60,000 and the advantage of having it quickly without waiting six
years for it may well be worth the price. Of course, if the Supplemental
System provides for an additional $200,000 instead of $100,000, the
claimant has a potential recovery of $300,000 and thus is probably better
off than under a completely unregulated compensation system. Admittedly,
these are over-simplified examples, but they do make the point that
the claimant does not necessarily suffer all the disadvantages Lee
Kreindler notes and that there are real compensatory advantages to the
international passenger under the Guatemala Protocol system.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol6/iss2/5

4

